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RIGHTS AND DUTIES*
ARTHuR L. CoRmN
"We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created
equal and are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights."
This statement, in spite of literal inaccuracy in its every phrase, served
the purpose for which it was written. It expressed an aspiration, and
it was a fighting slogan. In order that slogans may serve their purpose,
it is necessary that they shall arouse strong, emotional belief, but it is
not at all necessary that they shall be literally accurate.
A large part of each human being's time on earth is spent in declaim-
ing about his "rights," asserting their existence, complaining of their
violation, describing them as present or future, vested or contingent,
absolute or conditional, perfect or inchoate, alienable or inalienable,
legal or equitable, in rem or in personam, primary or secondary, moral
or jural (legal), inherent or acquired, natural or artificial, human or
divine. No doubt still other adjectives are available. Each one
expresses some idea, but not always the same idea even when used
twice by one and the same person. They all need definition in the
interest of understanding and peace.
In his table of correlatives, Hohfeld set "right" over against "duty"
as its necessary correlative. This had been done numberless times by
other men. He also carefully distinguished it from the concepts
expressed in his table by the terms "privilege," "power," and "immu-
nity."' To the present writer, the value of his work seems beyond
question and the practical convenience of his classification is convinc-
ing. However, the adoption of Hohfeld's classification and the correlat-
ing of the terms "right" and "duty" do not complete the work of
classification and definition. 2
* The present article is intended to be analytical and descriptive only. An
attempt will be made to show what sorts of societal action or inaction justify
us in using the terms "right" and "duty," but not what motives and causes
underlie this societal action or inaction. The explanation of the latter will be
found in an understanding of the mores of a people and the evolutionary process
of their development.
'Hohfeld's work has been published by the Yale Press in a volume entitled
Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1923). It is also found under the same name
in (1913) 23 YALE LAw JOURNAL, i6; (1917) 26 ibid. 71o.
'The word "right," as everyone knows, has many meanings. The Century
Dictionary recognizes at least twenty as an adjective and ten as a noun. To a
less extent this is also true of the word "duty." Nevertheless, the use of "right"
as correlative to "duty" marks a very great limitation, one that is difficult for
the human tongue, accustomed to a confusion of some twenty meanings, to
observe strictly. It would be possible to abandon the word to its very loose
and shifting significance. Such inclusive terms, of variable connotation, render
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As a working definition, let us suggest that a jural right is a relation
existing between two persons when society commands that the second
of these two shall conduct himself in a certain way (to act or to for-
bear) for the benefit of the first. A "right" exists when its possessor
has the aid of some organized governmental society in controlling the
conduct of another person. The first is said to have a "right" against
the second and the latter a "duty" to the first.
In this definition the term "society" may be troublesome. Some
would prefer "state" to "society."3  We need not here attempt a final
choice among terms- or definitions; but in using the term "society" or
the word "state" the writer does not mean to denote any personified
sovereign unit. If such a unit exists its "command" and its punitive
sanctions create jural rights and duties.4 As used and defined in this
article, jural rights and duties require only some group of persons,
organized for governmental purposes, and represented by agents whose
reaction to specific facts, for and against individual persons, can be
predicted with reasonable certainty.
some service, even though they also promote uncertain concepts and inaccurate
reasoning. The less we realize this uncertainty and inaccuracy, the more we
cling to general expressions like "my rights."
Hohfeld, indeed, considered substituting the word clabit for "right" as the
correlative of "duty." The present writer is not unwilling to agree to this
substitution if it should be pressed by others, although he believes that it would
tend to perpetuate our habitual contentment with uncertainty of concept and
inaccuracy of results. In the present article, "claim" is not substituted for
"right"; and as will appear from repeated definitions in the text, "right" is
used in Hohfeld's restricted sense as the correlative of "duty."
" Some would even personify this conceptual monad, asserting for it an objec-
tive reality, crowning its beloved head with "sovereignty," endowing it with
juristic omnipotence and with all the other qualities of the most up-to-date
anthropomorphic deity. A "pluralistic" conception would suit others better,
dividing up the royal inheritance among many contesting monads, each dissatisfied
with its share and vigorously striving for an increase.
' If there are several societal organizations of men, acting at times together
and at times in competition, each with its own commands and sanctions, each
with its own enforcing agents and procedure, then each will be creating a set
of rights and duties within its own chosen field. These last may at times
directly conflict, one commanding "thou shalt," another "thou shalt not." Both
are "law," as long as one has not definitely overpowered the other. There have
been examples of this in our own juristic history. Common Law and Equity
thus conflicted, and not even the resolution of King James I to back Lord Elles-
mere against Lord Coke entirely quenched the conflict. The conflict between
State and Nation was ended by the Civil War; but there is still a twilight zone
of conflict that is capable of causing new convulsions. New groups of individuals
are forming and organizing, competing for power, commanding and sanctioning.
Insofar as they can maintain themselves in the physical struggle, and insofar
as their "societal" action can be predicted, it may logically be said that they
are creating "rights" and "duties." Differences in degree are not negligible,
however, and it may be inadvisable to dignify with the term "law" or the term
"rights" the rules and sanctions of every association of lunatics or every criminal
Mafia.
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Other troublesome terms are "relation" and "commands." It does
not help much to describe a right as a "relation." What is a "relation"?
It is not a physical thing, but it involves physical relations of cause and
effect. In the present instance, we mean merely that because of par-
ticular facts we can predict certain detrimental consequences to B if
he does not conduct himself in the specified way, these consequences
being action (or more rarely, inaction) by a few individuals as the
agents of society. Experience has led us to believe that there is a
uniformity in human behavior such that we can construct rules thereof
and can predict consequences of facts with reasonable confidence.
When we say that society "commands" we do not mean that someone
is shouting hortatory words at B from a housetop or from a throne,
although there may be such an actual shout (as when the traffic police-
man says "stop" or "move on"). We mean generally no more than
that there is in some degree a uniformity of societal action and that
unless B conducts himself in a certain manner this societal action will
be detrimental to B.
There are, however, various kinds of rights and they must be classi-
fied. The societal action detrimental to B may be impending either
more or less immediately in time and with a greater or less degree of
certainty. Furthermore there are many different kinds of societal
consequences constituting the sanction or penalty for disobedience. It
is possible, therefore, to classify our "rights" both in accordance with
the facts determining the immediacy and certainty of the penalty and
with the character assumed by that penalty. The degree of uncertainty
may be so great, or the penalty become so slight, that we cease to
describe the situation by the terms jural right and duty. Here, as else-
where, our most important concerns depend upon distinctions of degree.
The classifications attempted by means of the adjective modifiers men-
tioned at the beginning are mainly of this sort. Some consideration
will first be given to these common terms.
Divine rights. No recognition can be allowed to such a term as
"divine right." It profits little, in our abysmal ignorance, to trace
"rights" back to a first cause that is itself quite beyond any finite
imagination. Of course, it is just as easy to throw upon the Creator
responsibility for our legal and social system as for the physical uni-
verse. But that is the only sense in which men are "endowed by their
Creator" with any rights; and in that sense men are endowed by their
Creator with all of their rights without exception. We cannot find
some that are supernatural or divine while others are not. Some are
of more value than others and some are more nearly universal than
others, but the basis of classification is value and generality of enjoy-
ment, not divinity.
Natural rights. Not much more need be said of "natural" rights
than of supernatural or divine rights. Probably the terms often express
the same idea. Some persons prefer to use the word nature instead
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of God or Creator to express that which they do not understand. It
has long been the custom, when a limited human intelligence conceives
of something that for the moment seems extremely desirable, to describe
it by such terms as divine, perfect, ideal, natural. In the law, the appeal
to "natural justice" had its day. Perhaps the idea originally behind
that term was justice "in a state of nature," as men were created before
the fall, in the good old golden days. That day is past; the "state of
nature" is being forgotten; we are beginning to express our notions
of what is desirable by new phrases (e. g. "social justice").
As the term "natural justice" has been used in the recent past,5 its
connotation is reasonably close to that of the newer term "social
justice," although the latter seems to distinguish more specifically
between the individual and the group. The assertion of "rights" and
the appeal to justice, whether "natural" or "social," no doubt often
rest upon an assumption of an eternal system superior to the will of
man and to human legislation. If such a system exists, it is as yet
beyond human knowledge. In invoking such a system as a basis for
decision, we are merely applying our own social standards and the
mores of our own "chosen" people and asserting for them the quality
of universality and perfection. In fact they have no such quality. The
standards, the mores, and the justice of yesterday are not those of
to-day. It is true that some standards and some of the mores are
common to many peoples and perhaps to the whole period of recorded
history. In these cases we can predict for the future with some confi-
dence. This merely shows a variation in degree, however; and it
remains true that for most litigated questions the past has no uniform
"In Rex v. Local Govwrnnent Board [1914, C. A.] i K. B. i6o, there was a
statute providing that the Local Government Board "may by rules determine
the procedure of any appeal." (19o9) 9 Edw. VII, c., 44, -sec. 39. Buckley,
L. J., said (p. 185): "Such rules must be rules consistent with natural justice.
For instance, the Board could not make a rule, (i) that neither the appellant
nor the local authority should be heard orally or in writing or in any manner
whatsoever; nor (2) that each should be heard but only in the absence of the
other; nor (3) that neither should be informed of the facts alleged or arguments
advanced by the other. These would each and all be contrary to natural justice."
Hamilton, L. J., (in a dissenting opinion) referring to foreign judgments and
the expression "contrary to natural justice," said (p. i99) : "It has often been
pointed out that the expression is sadly lacking in precision. At one time it was
regarded as setting up for foreign jurisdictions a standard of judicial correct-
ness upon the pattern of our common-law Courts, but times have changed. In
Buchanan v. Rucker (i8o7) i Camp. 63, 66, Lord Ellenborough at nisi prius
declared that the practice of the Law Courts of Tobago to summon a defendant
who was out of the jurisdiction and never had been within it, by nailing the
writ on the door of the court-house 'is contrary to the first principles of reason
and justice .... it is mala praxis, and cannot be sanctioned.' Nevertheless,
this weighty opinion, which having regard to the circumstances seems, I must
say, to be very temperately expressed, was coldly dismissed as 'declamation' by
the Court of Queen's Bench in Schibsby v. Westenholz (i87o) L. R. 6 Q. B.
155, i6o."
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answer and the future will answer in its own good time and manner.
"Natural justice" and "social justice" are merely the system of the
time and place, based upon the mores of the particular people involved,
as those mores have developed and survived in the people's rigorous
struggle for existence. In this sense, "natural justice" is an ever-living
source of law and of "rights ;" but it should be recognized for what it
is-a complex system of human notions, variable with the people and
changeable with time.5
Inherent rights. An appeal is still occasionally made to "inherent"
rights." These are usually identical with "natural" and "divine"; but
the term may also at times cariy some crude, figurative notion of a
physical "inherence." Like "divine" and "natural," the term
"inherent" has helped to make a good slogan. It is of no service to
classification and it renders a disservice to understanding.
Moral rights and ditties. Much space has been devoted to explaining
differences between morality and law, between moral duty and legal
duty. Perhaps there is reason to expect more violent disagreement
here than with the previous paragraphs. It may be observed first, how-
ever, that the distinctions between moral rights and legal rights are
identical with those between moral duties and legal duties, although the
latter are the terms more commonly discussed, and that the term "legal"
means jural, or juristic, and does not involve different systems of law
such as canon law and civil law, common law and equity. It is believed
that there is no exact and well-defined line separating the moral and the
legal fields. When we say that A has a right against B and that B
owes the correlative duty to A, we mean that the other individuals with
whom A and B are associated, whether the individuals are more or less
numerous and the territory occupied greater or less in extent, require
B to act in a certain manner for A's benefit and will themselves act to
'a Thus, in (1923) 39 LAW Q. REv. 5,8, Sir Frederick Pollock writes: "The
law of nature is not a chaos of individual opinions but a tradition of universal
reason confirmed by the general custom of civilized mankind." "Natural justice,
founded in reason and verified by the usage of just men, is recognized and applied
by judicial authority no less than the rules of international law, which ultimately
rest on the same ground." As indicated above, "individual opinions" often agree,
and there is a "tradition" that easily leads us into the false notion of "universal
reason." Every people is easily convinced, inasmuch as the verification is by
"civilized mankind" and by "just men," and those terms just describe us.
See Surocco v. Geary (1853) 3 Calif. 7o, where the court says: "The right to
destroy property, to prevent the spread of a conflagration, has been traced to the
highest law of necessity, and the natural rights of man, independent of society or
civil government . . . . The common law adopts-the principles of the natural
law . .. .
"The so-called right to hold office is not a natural or inherent right. It is
a privilege which arises from the organization of our civil society. If there is
nothing in our fundamental law guaranteeing the privilege, then the people,
through their official agency, the Legislature, may take it away." Crampton v.
'O'Mara (1923, Ind.) 139 N. E. 36o, 362.
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the detriment of B if he does not act as required. This is the' case
whether we describe A's right and B's duty as moral or as legal. The
difference lies in the form that the detrimental action takes in case B
disregards the requirement; it lies in the "sanction" and only in the
"sanction." If it consists of action in accordance with some rule of
general application by the executive or judicial representatives of an
organized governmental society, the right and duty being enforced are
recognized as jural. If the action detrimental to B is solely by indi-
viduals who are not representatives of such a society, the right and duty,
if any, are moral. It may be difficult at times to determine whether an
individual is acting as an official representative of society. We shall
consider below some of the various kinds of sanctions, of detrimental
action by our fellow men, and shall express an opinion as to which ones
justify the use of the term moral right and which the term legal right.
Equitable rights. Juristic rights have been very generally divided
into two classes known as legal and equitable. It is not easy to find
any attempt at exact definitions of these. It is probable that, as the
terms are used, exact definition is impossible. The classification arose
out of the fact that the law of England came to be determined in its
major part by a dual system of courts, by the Lord Chief Justice on the
one hand and the Lord Chancellor on the other, the latter supplementing
and modifying the work of the former. The Chief Justice's court (not
meaning literally that it was one court) was the earlier in time, and its
great work was the unification of English law, the gathering together
of the mass of varying rules applied by local courts and courts of
special jurisdiction and welding them into a common system. Thus
the law of this great court came to be known as the common law of
England. Thus the earlier law of various tribes, like the Saxon law
and the Dane law, became nothing but historical sources; the local law
of the barons, the sheriffs, and the cities was merged and forgotten;
and even the law applicable to special classes of persons, like the law
of the merchants, became eventually a part of the common system.
After centuries of work by judges of the king's court such as Bracton,
Coke, and Mansfield, the "law" of England was understood to be the
system applied by the King's Bench and Common Bench. The adjec-
tive "legal" went naturally with the "law," and "legal rights" meant
the rights of Englishmen under the common law. The unification was
never complete, however, not even being fully accomplished by the
Judicature Act of 1873. Prior to that statute there remained the Courts
of Admiralty, the Church, and the Chancery, and perhaps others. Of
all these, only the Court of Chancery had a system of law that applied
so generally as to appear in the minds of men as a successful competitor
with the great common law of the two Benches. Because of the politi-
cal influence of the Chancellors and because of the character of the
system they developed, the competition of equity with the common law
was successful. Many of the rules of the two Benches were substan-
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tially nullified by the Chancery, even before that fact was acknowledged
by the judges themselves. Duties were imposed on individuals and
rights created in others where the common law had left privileges and
no rights.7 In other cases individuals were given privileges of action
or inaction where the common law enforced a duty to act or to forbear."
Facts were given different operation, constituting causes of action and
defences unknown to the Benches. In spite of its measurably success-
ful competition, however, the system of law applied in the Chancery
was described as "equity" and not as "the law," many of its jural
relations were called "equities," its rights were "equitable rights" as
opposed to the "legal rights" of the common law, its "titles" were
"equitable titles" as opposed to "legal titles" recognized by the
Benches.
The jurisdiction of the Chancellor was just as wide territorially as
that of the Chief Justice. The law of the Chancery was as truly deservr
ing of the adjective "common" as was that of the Benches; indeed,
both systems are no doubt generally included under the one name when
the common law as a great system is being compared with the civil law
of Rome.
It should be remembered that the law of England was never in fact
a dual system of law and equity. It could not have been so before the
development of the Chancery as a court; and even thereafter there was
a remnant of jurisdiction left to the Admiralty and to the Church, each
with its own sanctions and its own procedure. It should be remem-
bered further that while there has been the constant tendency toward
unification by the welding of law and equity through both legislative and
judicial action, there has been an even greater development toward
complexity and conflict due to the multiplication of independent political
jurisdictions. Canadian law is not that of England, the law of Ontario
is not that of Quebec, the law of Illinois is not that of New York.
Thus, while the line between law and equity has become blurred and is
disappearing, distinctions between Illinois rights and New York rights
have been increasing.
Rights vary with the community. As said heretofore, the existence
of a right in A against B and of a correlative duty in B to A means that
the organized fellow citizens of A and B will act against B for A's
benefit unless B conducts himself as required. These fellow citizens
For example, certain conduct by an occupant of land was forbidden by the
Chancery as being waste, although not forbidden by the King's Bench. Many
duties were enforced against a trustee by the former that were unknown to
the. latter.
' This was true in all cases where certain facts, such as fraud or mistake,
constituted an "equitable" defense but were no defense at common law. The
King's Bench was ready to enforce its penalties against the defendant; the
Chancellor prevented the plaintiff from asking for such enforcement until eventu-
ally the common-law penalties became practically negligible.
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may be more or less numerous and the territory occupied greater or less
in extent. A "right" does not have existence as a thing, indepen-
dently of human individuals and a social organization. We cannot say
once a right always a right, or here a right everywhere a right. Certain
facts existing or events occurring in Ohio may be sufficient to cause the
courts of Ohio, as the agents of the people of Ohio, to act against B for
the sake of A, without being sufficient to cause the courts of Iowa to
take any action whatever. In such case, A has an Ohio right against B.
but not an Iowa right. The relations of Ohio with Iowa under our
constitution, however, are such that usually the same facts will be
legally operative in both states. A then has a right against B in both
Ohio and Iowa.9 The same may be true in the case of two wholly
independent states, such as France and England. This applies not
only to rights, but to other jural relations, to privileges, powers, and
immunities, and to complex combinations of them like the ownership of
land or the status of marriage. A and B may be husband and wife in
Ohio or in France, and be utterly divorced and unmarried in Iowa or
England. It all depends, and it depends wholly, upon what the individ-
uals of the organized community actually will do and hold themselves
out as ready to do in the particular case. The sanctions and the proce-
'Even though each of the two States or nations recognizes certain operative
facts as creating a right in A against B, that right is not necessarily the same
right in both places-that is, the performance required by B may not be identical.
Also, both the remedies available and the procedure that is prescribed may be
entirely different. In Guinness v. Miller (1923, S. D. N. Y.) 291 Fed. 769, a
citizen of the United States sued to collect from a German on a stated account
payable in marks. Learned Hand, D. J., said: "The sole question is whether
the decree should be for the value in dollars of the marks when the account
was stated, December 16, 1917, or for their value as of the date of the decree.
In the case of tort committed in a foreign jurisdiction it is pretty clear that the
judgment should be based on the exchange at the time of the loss inflicted. In
such cases we are familiar with the idea that his wrong imposes on the tort-
feasor an obligation to indemnify his victim in money. A court of the sovereign
where the tort occurs enforces this obligation in the money of that sovereign.
regardless of its change in value, merely because those are the terms in which
it is cast. When a court takes cognizance of a tort committed elsewhere, it is
indeed sometimes said that it enforces the obligation arising under the law where
the tort arises. And, if this were true, it would seem to follow that the obliga-
tion should be discharged in the money of the sovereign in whose territory the
tort occurred, and that the proper rule would be to adopt the rate of exchange
as of the time of the judgment. However, no court can enforce any law but
that of its own sovereign, and, when a suitor comes to a jurisdiction foreign
to the place of the tort, he can only invoke an obligation recognized by that
sovereign."
The court held that the debtor's American duty was to pay the value of the
promised marks in dollars as of December 16, 1917; but the German duty could
be discharged by paying in German marks of the sort current in 1923. The
same facts create these duties, but the duties are not the same. The court truly
said: "Each court is enforcing a different obligation, imposed by a different
sovereign, necessarily defined in terms of its own money."
RIGHTS AND DUTIES
dure in the two communities may be very different, just as they were in
the case of the Chancellor and the Chief Justice. Even if the sanctions
are identical, some of the accompanying jural relations may not be so.
Property rights. The distinctions between rights in rem and rights
in personam are no more certain and no more generally agreed upon
than are the distinctions already discussed. "Property" rights are
among the rights said to be "in rem"; contract rights among those "in
personam." Nevertheless, a contract right is also said to be "property."
Such a classification is clearly a rough one, with a blurred boundary
between, and it fails to be of service in many an emergency. Some-
times we think clearly and specifically of the comparatively simple jural
relations between two persons, A and B. What will society do for A
against B alone? At other times we think loosely and generally of the
complex jural relations between A- and an indefinite number of other
persons not specifically identified.' 0 What will society do for A against
whom it may concern? In either case, however, when the societal action
occurs it will affect specific individuals. If A "owns" land, with
rights "in rem," he has a right against B that B shall not trespass, as
well as similar rights against others. B is under a duty to A not to
trespass. A's right against B is just as personal as it would be if B had
contracted not to trespass, and as it would be if B were the only person
under such a duty. There are very important differences between the
procedure by which property rights and other rights "in ren" can be
affected and the procedure for affecting rights "in personam"; but in
both kinds of rights alike there is the command of society to an indi-
vidual with threat of societal action against him for A's benefit. Even
where procedure is "in rem," as in an admiralty proceeding "against a
ship," it is the jural relations of individuals that are being affected.
The ship may be sold and title given to a buyer. The owner of the ship
formerly had a right against B that the latter should not trespass. Now
he has that right no longer. The same is true of rights that the owner
had against other persons. We describe the total by saying that the
owner's "title" is gone and his rights "in rem" are extinguished.1
" See Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note i, also found in
(1917) 26 YALE LAW JOuRNAL, 710; Kocourek, Rights in Rem (1920) 68 U. PA.
L. REv. 322.
When a contract right is said to be "pr~perty," this does not mean that the con-
tract right is itself a "property right." The word "property" is then being used in
the sense of "subject matter" or res. As such a res, a horse is "property"; but
a horse is not a "property right." The value of the contract right to its holder is
protected by, the creation of additional rights against innumerable and unidentified
third persons that they shall not interfere with performance. These are the
"property" that one has in his "contract."
"It would be an extremely useful social achievement if people could be made
to understand that "property" rights (rights in rem) are just as personal as
are contract rights and other rights in personam. In the Century Dictionary, a
right in rem is defined thus: "the legal relation between a person. and a thing
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Inalienable rights. When a right is said to be "alienable," the
meaning is usually the same as that expressed by assignable. This
meaning is that the holder of the right has also a-power of substituting
another person in his place, of extinguishing his own right and creating
a like one in the person substituted. Practically every contract and
property right has come to be alienable in this sense. "Alienable" may
also be used to mean that the holder of the right has the power to
extinguish it without any substitution of another holder. Such a power
is exercised when a creditor executes a discharge of his debtor. There
are some rights that are not alienable in either of the foregoing senses.
such as the right not to be stabbed with felonious intent and the right
not to be robbed, the inalienability in such cases resting on prevailing
notions of public policy. "Inalienable" may also be used in a third sense,
that the power of extinguishment does not exist in persons other than
the holder of the right. Such a: power of alienatioi often exists with
the assent of the holder of the right, and sometimes without his assent.
Thus, the power to assign or to discharge is often intentionally con-
ferred upon an agent. If one steals my money I still have property
rights, and yet the thief has power to extinguish them by paying the
money to an innocent taker for value. In addition to this, every right
without exception can be extinguished totally by the withdrawal of the
societal sanction. If the term "right" is used as defined herein, connot-
ing nothing but a societal command and sanction, it is clear that those
who issue the command can countermand it and that those who threaten
the penalty can withdraw the threat.1 Thus disappears any supposedly
in which he has an interest or over which he has a power, as distinguished from
a right in personam, or the legal relation of a person to another who owes him
a duty." A great deal of declamation against the supposed failure to prefer
"human" rights over "property" rights is based upon the same error that the
Century here makes. All jural relations are between persons, either as indi-
viduals or in groups. "Things" do not have rights, and there is no "legal
relation between a person and a thing." "Thou shalt not steal" is a rule of
property; but its operation is wholly for persons and against persons, just as
in the case of the rule "Thou shalt not kill." Every "property" right of A
has its correlative duty in some other person B and operates in personam.
Like all other rights, property rights have been developed in the evolution of
humanity as a means of human survival in comfort, for the sake of "life, liberty.
and the pursuit of happiness." It does not follow from this that they are "divine"
or unchangeable; on the contrary it follows that they are "human" and are subject
to 'criticism and alteration. Emotional criticism and unintelligent alteration are
certain to result in the destruction of existing wealth (subject matter) and the
non-production of more, with resulting "human" misery and death. Mossback
resistance to intelligent alteration has the same result.
'Some "rights" in the United States are accompanied by constitutional provi-
sions depriving the States or Congress of power to annul them. In such cases
the societal sanction can be withdrawn and the right destroyed only by those
having the power to amend the constitution. By such amendment, however, we
can be deprived of our most cherished rights.
Fundamenial rights. It has been argued that citizens have rights so "funda-
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"inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." The
writers of the great Declaration may have thought their rights -"inalien-
able" by King George or by Parliament because they believed in some
"natural" or some "divine" sanction. Very likely, however, they
meant merely to tell the world that they had a violent desire for life
and liberty and for the oppoitunity to pursue happiness without a stamp
tax, and that for these things they were ready to pledge their "sacred
honor," and even the "lives" to which they asserted an inalienable
right.
Future and conditional rights. The pairs of terms "future or
present," "vested or contingent," "absolute or conditional," and
"perfect or inchoate" can advantageously be discussed together. As
the term is herein used, a "right" in A against B means that *"society"
commands B to act or to forbear, with some penalty for disobedience.
This command of "society" is caused by the existence of certain facts.
It will not be attempted here to explain the meaning of causation, or
why out of the sum-total of antecedent facts we pick out a few and
describe them as the "cause." This process is universal, however;, and
upon it our system of law is based. These causal or "operative" facts,
as they are called herein, may be numerous and they may not all have
occurred or as yet exist. Thus, in the case of a loan of money by A to
B, the delivery of the money to B and the promise of B to repay are
among the operative facts; but so also is the arrival of the date of
maturity. Prior to that date, but after the loan and the promise, we
say that B owes a debt to A. "Society" commands B to pay A at
maturity. Perhaps this relation of B to A can be described conveniently
as a future duty. Action by B is not expected at once and his non-
action will not be penalized in any way. After maturity, however,
instant action is expected and non-action will be penalized if the-neces-
sary procedure is taken by A. This is the difference between "future"
and "present" rights.
mental" in character as to be beyond extinguishment by any societal organization.
This amounts to no more than an appeal to "God." More often it has been
asserted that certain rights are so "fundamental" that the power of a State or of
Congress to "alienate" them has been taken away by the constitution (especially by
the fourteenth amendment). There have been some attempts to enumerate these
"rights," usually including all sorts of jural relations and factual interests. See
Corfield v. Coryell (1825, C. C. Pa.) 4 Wash. C. C. 371, 380, Fed. Cas. 3230.
Such limitations on the powers of legislative bodies are to be determined by the
usual methods of constitutional interpretation. They may exist; but it is to be
observed that the attempts to establish them have usually failed. See Slaughter-
House Cases (1872, U. S.) 16 Wall. 36 (argument of the mifnority); Spies v.
Illinois (887) 123 U. S. 13I, 8 Sup. Ct. 22; Maxwell v. Dow (I9OO) 176 U. S.
581, 20 Sup. Ct 448, 494; McCray v. U. S. (1904) i95 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769;
Waugh v. Board of Trustees (914) 237 U. S. 589, 37 Sup. Ct. 720. The term
"fundamental" merely indicates the degree of importance with which the right so
described is regarded by those wishing to preserve or to possess it.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
All "present" rights in the sense above stated are also "vested,"
"absolute"' 8 and "perfect" as those terms are customarily used.
"Future" rights, however, are not necessarily so. In the creation of a
right the operative facts seldom if ever occur at a single moment of
time; they are instead a number of facts occurring in a series chrono-
logically. If all the operative facts exist or have occurred with the
exception of the passage of some fixed time, the right is a "future"
right, but we do not refer to it as conditional, contingent, imperfect, or
inchoate. Instead, we call it "vested" and "unconditional." If, how-
ever, some act or some event other than the passage of time must occur
before society will regard its command as disobeyed, then the right and
duty are not only "future" but are also "conditional."
Consider the following cases: (i) A holds B's note for $ioo, payable
upon the death of X. The operative facts constituting mutual assent,
consideration, and delivery have occurred. But the death of X is also
a necessary event and it has not yet occurred. It is said to be a condi-
tion precedent to A's presently enforcible right; and meantime A's rela-
tion to B is called a "conditional" right. This condition is one that is
certain to occur, but at an uncertain time. A's right would be described
as "vested," if that term is to be used at all with respect to rights "in
personam."
(2) A holds B's note for $ioo, payable upon the arrival of the ship
"Titanic." Here again, all the operative facts except one have
occurred; but that one is not certain to occur at any time. Neverthe-
less we say that A has a "right" and describe it as "conditional." Our
ordinary legal terms do not differentiate it from A's right in case
number (i).
(3) A holds B's promise under seal to pay $ioo upon the delivery
of certain goods by A. In this case the condition is an act of A, the
holder of the "right." As in number (2), this condition may never
" "Absolute" is not always used as the opposite of "conditional." Thus the
Century Dictionary)defines "Absolute rights" as "those rights which belong to
human beings as such; those rights to which corresponds a negative obligation
of respect on the part of every one. They are usually accounted to be three-
the right of personal security, of personal liberty, and of private property ....
They are termed absolute in contradistinction to those to which corresponds
the obligation of a particular person to do or .forbear from doing some act
which are termed relative." In substance, this makes "absolute right" identical
with "right in rem." The Century cannot mean that "absolute" means "inalien-
able," inasmuch as many "human beings as such" daily have their rights of
security, liberty, and property qxtinguished, both voluntarily and involuntarily.
Further, all rights are "relative," in that they are relations with other persons
and in that they are dependent upon the existence of facts.
The Standard Dictionary defines Absolute rights as "those rights that are inherent
in the individual, inalienable and indefeasible; as man's absolute rights to life,
liberty, and personal security." See also Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity
Jurisdiction (1887) I HA.v. L. REv. 55. Austin, Jurisprudence (3d ed. 1869) 753,
has an excellent criticism of the term "absolute rights."
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occur, and its occurrence depends upon the will and physical capacity of
A. Again we say that A has a "conditional" right."
(4) A holds B's promise under seal to pay $ioo if B shall himself
go to York. This is like number (3) in all respects, except that the
occurrence of the conditioning fact depends upon the will and physical
capacity of B, the promisor. A's relation to B is here less advantageous
than in number (3) because B is legally privileged not to go to York.
The "condition" depends upon B's will and not upon A's. Neverthe-
less, we still say that A has a "conditional" right.'5
(5) A holds B's promise under seal to pay $ioo upon the death of
C, if a premium shall be paid by A and if B shall continue in business.
Here we have a combination of conditions. Numberless other combina-
tions are possible. The same operative facts have occurred as in the
preceding cases, but there are more operative facts still to occur. The
greater the number, the greater the uncertainty and the less the value of
A's right. There is a valid "contract," however, and A still is said
to have a "conditional" right.16
In the five cases preceding, we have assumed that the operative facts
necessary to what is called a valid "contract" have occurred. Had we
assumed less, we should hardly be justified in saying that a "right" has
been created. Thus, if one party makes an offer to enter into a contract
of any of the foregoing sorts, but there has been no acceptance, no
usage justifies us in saying that even a conditional right exists. And
yet, one of the necessary operative events has occurred. The train of
operative facts is started. Each of the remaining events is as neces-
sary as another, is as truly a "condition" as any other. Usage, how-
ever-perhaps a somewhat arbitrary usage-fixes the point in the
sequence of facts at which a conditional "right" is said to exist.
Before reaching that point, we may perhaps be justified in using the
vague term "inchoate right.' 7  It is doubtful whether this term
renders any service of value.
'The description of A's right would not be changed in case A had promised
B in return to deliver the goods. Such a promise by A would be a new opera-
tive fact and would cause B to have a "right" as well as A, and A to have a
"duty" as well as B. The "contract" would then be described as "bilateral."
"' See Scott v. Moragues Lumber Co. (I918) 2o2 Ala. 312, 80 So. 394.
If B has made a binding promise to A to go to York, this does not affect the
description of A's right. Such promise gives A an additional "right" and B
an additional "duty." It would not cafise the "contract" to be described as
"bilateral."
'There are various advantageous classifications of these future operative
facts called "conditions." See Corbin, Cases on Contracts (1921) 478. With
the increasing complexity of human affairs and business agreements, new com-
binations are daily considered by the courts and new combinations of jural
relations recognized. This is one reason why the old complex and general con-
cepts of the law are no longer adequate for the analysis of a problem and for
clear statement of its solution.
'In Michaels v. Pontius (1922, Ind. App.) 137 N. E. 579, it is said: "The
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In certain fields of the law the term "vested right" has played a part
of some importance, but it is not a term that yields easily to definition.
In the law of property, "vested" is contrasted with "contingent," as
in the case of vested and contingent remainders. A "remainder,"
however, is a complex interest consisting of many jural relations, not of
a simple "right." It requires a full analysis that will not be attempted
here. A "vested" right does not mean solely an unconditional, present
right. In constitutional law, perhaps, a "vested" right is one that
under prevailing constitutions is not subject to confiscation; but this is
true of many conditional future rights. Doubtless, rights are "vested"
when there is not too great a degree of uncertainty as to the occurrence
of the necessary conditions in the future. The exact line can be picked
out only by empirically collecting the decided cases.
Absolute duties. The term "absolute" when applied to duties is some-
times given a meaning different from any that is given it when applied
to rights. It is sometimes said that while a right never exists without
its correlative duty, certain duties can exist without any correlative
rights1 7 a  Such duties are said to be "absolute," not meaning that such
duties are not relations with other persons, but meaning that such other
persons do not have rights that are correlative to the duties. Examples
given are the duty to abstain from cruelty to animals or from certain
acts of immorality, and duties to a child yet unborn. It is believed that
this distinction is unsound and that such use of the term "absolute" is
unfortunate. The matter is of practical importance, chiefly because if
there is inconsistency of language in this matter there is also an unclear
concept behind the term.
The concept behind the term "duty" seems to be that societal pressure
is put upon B to induce certain conduct by him-that the agents of an
organized society will act to B's disadvantage if he does not conduct
himself as desired. This societal action is taken-that is, "duties" are
created-for the protection and satisfaction of human interests and
property in question [fixtures], having been placed on the leased premises in
prospecting for oil, and operating the wells drilled thereon, gave the owner of
the land covered by the lease an inchoate right thereon. If the lease is still in
force, this right may be terminated by a removal of the property from the
premises before the expiration thereof, or within a reasonable time thereafter,
by the lessee, or someone deriving a right to do so from it; but if this is not
done it will ripen into a vested right. The owner of the land, therefore, has an
interest in preserving the property, which gives him and those claiming through
him a right of possession as against mere trespassers, who may seek to convert
the same to their own use, and thereby render such inchoate right valueless.Y'
This means that the lessor has a property interest, including present rights
against third persons; but he has also a liability to their extinguishment by
severance by the lessee.
"a See Austin, Jurisprudence (3d ed. 1869) 67, 412; Markby, Elements of Law
(6th ed. 1905) sec.- 5o; Korkunov, General Theory ,of Law (Hastings' Trans.
1909) 197, 211.
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desires. The rules determining the action of the officials of society are
designed for this purpose. It appears, therefore, that it would be possi-
ble in all cases to point out some human interest to be protected. Such
an interest is an interest of men. It may be the interest or desire of one
specified man alone, or of several specified men, or of some class of
unspecified men, or of all men generally. In any of these cases there
may be more or less difficulty in identifying the man or men in question;
but in the last case where they are the most numerous it would seem
that there is the least difficulty. These men with the factual interests
to be protected are the men with the "rights." In the case of a "duty
to the state" or "to society," the "interest" includes the common interests
of all. Each member has his interest and that interest is protected.
If that is what we mean by "right," then each has a "right." It is
merely a case where many persons have rights against one and the one
has a duty to each of the many. Like many other "obligations" to joint
or joint and several obligees, the obligor's duty to each can be satisfied
and extinguished by a single performance.
Where the duty is owed to one particular person, that person has a
special interest, one in which others do not participate. It therefore
looms large in his consciousness, and he it is who makes complaint of
its infringement. Where the duty is owed to each of many-as where
some person is cruel to his own beast-the breach does special injury
only to those who witness the cruelty, and little to them if they are well
hardened. In such cases, the many may have special officers appointed
for purposes of detection and complaint.
It must be constantly remembered that in speaking of "rights" and
"duties" we are not dealing with physical objects. We are merely
stating that somebody's interests will be promoted by legal coercion of
another person and that such coercion by societal action is obtainable.
It is quite possible to define "right" so as to require the interest to be that
of one specific person exclusively, and at the same time to define "duty"
so as to include cases where the interests are those of many unspecified
individuals. By such a definitional process, some duties can be made
to appear "absolute"-not correlative to rights; but there will never-
theless in every instance be human individuals whose interests are being
promoted by the societal coercion of the duty-bearer.
Primary rights. The existence of a "right" is caused by certain
operative facts. Among these facts there may or may not be conduct
by B amounting to a breach of a previous legal duty. If there is not,
the right in question is said to be "primary"; if there is such a breach,
the right against B is said to be "secondary" and "remedial." Thus, if
B promises to pay A $ioo at a future date for money lent, A's right
and B's duty are "primary." Likewise, A's right that B shall not tres-
pass on A's land or that B shall not negligently injure A is so described.
But if B trespasses on A's land or negligently injures A or breaks his
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contract with A, there is a right to damages in A and a new correlative
duty in B. This right and this duty are "secondary" and "remedial."
There are two substantial differences between the primary right and
duty and the secondary right and duty. First, in order to make the
secondary right, one new operative fact is added to those facts. that
created the primary right. Secondly, the performance required of B
to satisfy the societal command is a different performance. In the case
of a money debt, payment of the principal sum would extinguish the
primary right and duty. After breach, interest (damages) must be
paid as well as principal. In the case of a tort, B's primary duty
requires a forbearance to act so as to harm A, while his secondary duty
after commission of the tort requires the payment of reparation to A.
In some cases, on breach of his primary duty by B, that duty is
extinguished and the secondary duty substituted. This means that the
performance originally required of B is no longer required at all. It
may not even be permitted. Such would be the case where B has com-
mitted a "vital" breach of a contract to build and A has acted upon the
breach as final. In other cases, after breach, the primary and secondary
duties exist together, the punitive action of society being directed toward
securing the original performance due and an additional performance
by way of damages. This is true in the case of money debts and also
in the case.of breaches of contract where time is not of the essence.
The conduct required of B by the law is exactly what it was before the
breach, although it can now occur only at a later time; and the legal
sanctions are unchanged. This is what is meant by the statement that
the primary right and duty still exist.
The "enforcement" of A's right and B's duty means the application
of the sanction-the penalty-by societal agents. It is only in rare
cases that this application causes B to perform exactly as and when his
duty required. An injunction or a decree for specific performance in
equity comes near it at times; but the decree sometimes fails of its
purpose, and even when it succeeds, the performance is delayed and
halting. This is true also in the case of a judgment in an action of
debt. Occasionally the breach of a primary right may be successfully
prevented by an injunction or by a police officer. The declaratory
judgment no doubt sometimes has the same effect.
The foregoing may be equally true of both primary and remedial
rights. Hanging a murderer does not prevent his particular crime.
A judgment for damages does not prevent breach of the contract duty,
and it may equally fail to cause B to pay the damages adjudged. That
the sanction fails merely shows that not even "society" is omnipotent.
Nevertheless, the agents of that society acted according to their habit;
their behavior was as predicted, in aid of A and against B.
The judgment or decree of a court is a new and additional operative
fact. It is sufficient of itself to create a right and duty. Generally,
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it serves to liquidate and make certain that which before was
unliquidated and uncertain. Sometimes the performance required by
the judgment is different from that required by either the primary or
the secondary duty. Even if not, it has a legal operation in other
respects different from that of the pre-existing facts.
A and B and other litigants may have rights against societal officers
and agents. These might also be called "remedial" rights; but there
is little usage to warrant it. The jural relations of administrative
officers with other citizens form the subject matter of administrative
law. We shall not deal with them here, nor with the jural relations
between citizens and judicial officers.18
VARIETIES OF SOCrETAL SANCTIONS
The next matter for consideration is the character of the societal
sanction. What kinds of penalties justify us in saying that A has a
jural right and that B has the correlative jural duty? There are
differences in the severity of the penalty, even after its application has
become certain and the right has become present, unconditional, and
immediately enforceable. There are differences in the manner of
administering the penalty and in the officers by whom it is administered.
It is upon these differences, often a difference in degree alone, that the
definition and classification of jural rights largely depend. We should
follow judicial usage, and even popular usage, so far as this is not
inconsistent or vague and therefore not suitable for clear thinking and
accurate expression. The best approach is by considering in specific
cases the consequences to an individual of his failing to do that which is
said to be his duty.
In criminal law, penalties for wrongdoing vary all the way from
death and physical torture down to a reprimand. If society commands
B to act or to forbear under penalty of death or imprisonment or flog-
ging or a money fine or even a reprimand by the court, we do not hesi-
tate to say that B is under a legal duty to act or to forbear. Within
these limits, at least, the legal duty does not depend upon the weight
of the penalty. In each case, howeirer, the infliction of the penalty
involves affirmative action, by a representative of society, detrimental to
B. In the law of torts and contracts the penalty for wrongdoing is
usually money damages, this too involving affirmative action by judicial
and executive officers of "the law." Again the existence of the jural
duty does not depend upon the size of the penalty. It is not at all
"There is some recognition of other varieties of rights and some use of other
adjective modifiers. The writer has heard of "static" and "dynamic" rights, of
rights "in possession" and rights "in action," but he is unaware of any general
usage of the sort or any definite meanings. A "right" is not a physical chattel
to be held or thrown; nor is it electricity or energy. There is merely a uni-
formity of human behavior enabling us to inform B that if he acts in a certain
manner the minions of the law will get him, and to inform A that if B so acts
the minions will punish B and perhaps compensate A. This is more briefly
expressed by saying that A has a right against B and that B has a duty to A.
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uncommon for "punitive" damages to be awarded in addition to
"compensatory," both sorts being equally "punitive" in its broader
sense as far as the wrongdoer is concerned ;19 and statutes frequently
allow double or treble damages. 20  However, the passage of a statute
trebling the damages recoverable for a wrongful act has no effect what-
ever upon the duty itself the breach of which is the wrong complained
of. It creates no new duty, but merely adds a new sanction to the
existing duty.
Inasmuch as the existence of jural right and duty means nothing
except that organized society affords a systematic remedy or remedies
through its judicial and its executive or administrative officers, legisla-
tive action that abolishes all remedy and all sanction also abolishes the
right and the duty. Legislation that abolishes only some of the
remedies-part but not all of the sanction-does not abolish the right
or the duty. The abolition of imprisonment for debt materially changed
the remedy, but it did not extinguish the debt-the jural duty of the
debtor. However, since some remedies are more effective than others
for enforcing and securing performance of duty, a legislative change
in remedies may gravely affect the value or advantage of a right to its
possessor and the burden of a duty to its bearer.2 1  Our national consti-
tution deprives the States of power to extinguish certain rights, privi-
leges, and immunities, but not of power to vary existing remedies
within reasonable. limits. Legislation that affects only the procedure
by which the existence of facts is established or the existence of jural
relations is ascertained, no doubt also affects the value of rights, duties,
and other jural relations; but usually not so directly as does a change
of remedy.
22
"Modern humanitarians often distinguish between revenge and prevention,
between punishment and reparation. For our present purpose these distinctions
are immaterial. When one person suffers harm at the hands of another he
tends to react violently. His survival and prosperity depend largely upon the
future prevention of such harm. His emotions are aroused, he feels indignation.
This indignation will be described by his neighbors as "righteous" if they seem
to be threatened with similar harm. Therefore, they take steps to prevent the
harm by bringing about serious consequences to the harmdoer and by proclaim-
ing that similar consequences will follow future harm of the same sort. Thus,
a "sanction" is established and a "law" is made. Whether the "consequences"
should be light or heavy is to be determined by their effectiveness to secure the
desired object. But compensatory damages are awarded for the same general
reasons as are punitive damages, fines, and imprisonment-to prevent similar
harms in the future and to prevent private war.
"Thus, Conn. Gen. Sts. 1918, sec. 6144, gives treble damages against a thief
or receiver of stolen goods iri favor of the owner; sec. 6145, double damages
to one injured by forgery; sec. 6146, treble damages for wilful removal of a
bridge; sec. 6147, treble damages for injury to a milestone or guidepost; sec.
6148, treble damages for a vexatious suit. See also the Sherman Anti-trust
law and laws giving remedies for infringement of Patents and Copyrights.
'For example, see note 9, supra.
'This indicates that distinctions between "substantive law" and "adjective
law," or between "substance" and "procedure" are not so- fundamental as is
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It is not necessary to the existence of a jural duty that the sanction
or penalty should consist of affirmative action by an officer. Suppose
the only rule of law against homicide is this: Thou shalt not kill; if B
shall kill A, B shall be outlaw, and anyone (X)' is privileged to kill him
and to seize his goods. Surely this would be sufficient to create a
"duty" not to kill. The denial of the usual forms of protection, the
extinguishment of "personal" and "property" rights possessed by B
before his wrongful act, is itself a sanction and a penalty. Even if the
individual (X) who hunts the outlaw to his death should not be
regarded as a societal agent, the fact that the rule provides that the
sheriff and other peace officers will not act against X for killing B
operates as a heavy penalty and a preventive. It operates as a penalty
in spite of the fact that B may escape from X. Any criminal may
escape from jail or from the hangman. The one penalty that he can-
not escape is being "outlaw."
According to international law if a neutral merchant vessel is ordered
to stop by a belligerent vessel looking for contraband, the latter is
privileged to fire at and to sink the former if she does not obey the
command. Disobedience makes the neutral an "outlaw" to this extent.
The extinguishment of the neutral's right of security and the creation
of a legal privilege in the belligerent to send death and destruction seem
to be an ample sanction for legal duty and to justify our saying that the
neutral is under a "duty" to heave to when commanded: In this
instance the privilege to fire is only temporary; if the neutral ship runs
and escapes, the privilege of sinking her would not survive and no
further penalty for her disobedience will be assessed.
By the Roman law, and perhaps also by our own, certain claims were
enforced only by giving to the claimant a "lien" on goods in his posses-
sion.23  The creation of a property interest, called a "lien," in the
claimant marks an-equal subtraction from the property interest of the
often believed; and yet reasonable distinctions can be drawn. Thus legislation
may directly create or extinguish rights and duties or other jural relations.
Such law is surely "substantive." Secondly, legislation may effect some change
in remedies without creating or extinguishing any jural relation between private
citizens A and B. Such legislation must, however, affect the jural relations
between each of these individuals and the societal officers charged with admin-
istering remedial law. It gives to A or takes from him a right that the Chan-
cellor shall issue an injunction or that the sheriff shall arrest B. This legisla-
tion is also "substantive," although falling within a sub-class called "remedial."
[This seems to have been overlooked by the court in Pusey & Jones v. Hanssen
(1923) 261 U. S. 491, 43 Sup. Ct. 454; COMMENTS (1923) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
193.] Thirdly, legislation may affect procedure only, as by changing the burden
of proof or by making an interested party a competent witness or by limiting
cross-examination. This seems not to create or extinguish any jural relation
between any two litigating parties.
" "Leaving out of account merely moral obligations, not recognised by law,
not all which the law would enforce were equally enforceable. Most were
enforceable by action, but there Were a few cases in which the law did not
allow an action but did allow enforcement in indirect ways. There were cases
in which a claim could be enforced only by way of retention, not by action.
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one benefited by the claimant's service. This lien is created imme-
diately upon the service, and before the party served can be said to
have committed a breach of duty. Therefore it is not a "penalty" for
breach. It is nevertheless a means taken by society for "enforcing"
the payment of a claim, and it can be said with some reason to amount
to the recognition of a "right" and a "duty." Doubtless, some would
here deny the propriety of using the latter terms, and would prefer to
describe the situation by saying that the party benefited owes nothing
and is under no duty, that he has merely lost that part of his property
commensurate with the "lien" of the claimant but has the "power" to
destroy the lien and to recreate his own original property interest by
making a valid tender.
Is a creditor under a "duty" to a surety not to give an extension of
time to the principal debtor? It seems proper to say that he is; but
the only sanction or societal penalty for breach of such a duty is the
extinguishment of the creditor's rights against the surety, and no
affirmative action is taken by any officer against the creditor. Such a
penalty operates, however, more beneficially to the surety and more
detrimentally to the creditor than would a judgment for money
damages. Indeed, the rule has been severely criticised because it penal-
izes the creditor severely in cases where his action may have caused the
surety no loss whatever.
2 4
Is a depositor under a "duty" to his bank to examine returned
cancelled checks and to notify the bank in case he detects forgery? His
failure to do so has been held to extinguish his right to the sum paid
out by the bank on a forged check in his name.25  This is certainly a
severe penalty for non-action.
Thus a defendant in a real action could resist the claim unless reimbursed for
certain expenses, but could not recover them by independent action. There
was the same right where a creditor sought to enforce a pledge againsi a bona
fide holder . . . . The holder in commodatum or deposit had this right of reten-
tion apparently before he acquired an actio contraria, and at the beginnings of
the contract of pledge this right of retention of the res was, it seems, the only
right conferred by it." Buckland, Roman Law (1921) 407.
" See Cockburn, C. J., in Swire v. Redinan (1876) L. R. i Q. B. Div. 536.
It might be argued that the creditor's right against the surety is merely a
conditional one, the conditioning fact being his own forbearance to extend the
time of payment to the principal debtor; that society does not make it the
creditor's duty to forbear to extend the time, but merely puts it in his power to
acquire a right against the surety by so forbearing. One answer to this is that
such is not the language of the parties or their actual intention. The surety
makes a promise to the creditor for a consideration. He regards himself as
bound by a jural duty and the courts so regard him. His duty is conditional
upon the failure of the principal debtor to pay at maturity; but it is not regarded
as conditional upon forbearance to extend the time of payment. An extension
of time is regarded as increasing the surety's risk that the debtor will not pay
and as an injurious act, the penalty for which is the extinguishment of the
surety's existing duty to the creditor.
See Arant, Forged Checks-The Duty of a Depositor to his Bank (1922) 31
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Suppose that X represents to A that certain goods are his own and
induces A to buy them, while the real owner B stands by observing the
misrepresentation and its effect. Is B under a legal "duty" to A to
warn him as to the true ownership? It may properly be said that he is;
the "estoppel," the extinguishment of B's property interest, is the
societal penalty inflicted for his wrongful silence. So also, if X falsely
represents to A that he is the agent of B, with B's knowledge, it is said
to be B's "duty" to speak the truth to A.26 Yet the only penalty is
that silence operates as a ratification.
A husband and father is said to be under a duty to support his wife
and children. Affirmative sanctions have been invented to enforce this
duty; but an operative sanction exists in the "power" created in third
persons to create a duty to pay for necessaries furnished to wife or child.
The duty of a child to obey its parent is sanctioned by creating the
privilege to spank.
In the immediately foregoing cases, the societal penalty or sanction
consists in the creation of new and detrimental jural relations by rule of
law alone without any affirmative judicial or executive action. Clearly
distinguishable from these are the cases where a person's non-action is
followed, not by injurious physical or jural deprivations, but only by a
failure to make some possible affirmative gain. Thus if B discovers
gold on the public domain, he is under no duty to pick it up. He has
the legal power to make it his own; on his failure to exercise that power
the law takes nothing from him. Again, B is under no duty to advertise
his wares or to make offers, even though the result is that he makes no
sales. For the same reasons, he is under no duty to accept offers made
to him.2 7  When A has broken his contract with B, and B can, by
stopping work, easily prevent his loss from increasing, it is often said
that B is under a "duty to mitigate damages." It has been judicially
observed, however, that there is no such duty.28  B's failure to mitigate
his loss is not penalized by society. B's right to damages was created
and the amount computed as of the time of A's final breach. There-
after B's failure to discontinue work changes in no respect his jural
relations with A. Of course, B is losing money by reason of his action;
" "The person with whom the agent dealt will so obviously be deceived by
assuming the professed agent was authorized to act as such, that the principal
is under a duty to undeceive him." i Williston, Contracts (I92O) see. 278.
The offer creates a power of acceptance in the offeree; his failure to use
it may prevent his making a gain, but this is not a societal sanction. The same
is true of many jural powers. The holder of a life insurance policy is generally
under no duty to pay the premium, although only by so doing can he create a
right to payment by the company. In the. same way the holder of a negotiable
instrument is under no duty to give notice to an indorser; the latter has under-
taken a conditional duty, and the holder has power, by fulfilling the condition,
to make the duty unconditional. ,
" Burch, J., in Rock v. Vandine (i92o) io6 Kan. 588, i89 Pac. 157. See also
Scrutton, L. J., in Payzu v. Saunders [igi9, C. A.] 2 K. B. 581, 596.
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but so also does he lose money when he throws it into the sea, yet he is
under no duty not to throw it there. A creditor loses a valuable right
when he releases his debtor, but this loss is not a societal penalty for
doing a wrongful act. Hanging is a societal penalty for murder; a
suicide may reach the same result by hanging himself, but he is not
being penalized by society. 9
The criterion of jural rights and duties that is here adopted seems
to be quite inconsistent with any "sanction of nullity." It is readily
admitted that the adopted criterion is not a necessary one, all others
being "untrue." It is suggested merely as a criterion that works, one that
is convenient and in harmony with generally prevailing usage. The usual
distinctions between "void" and "illegal" contracts sustain it. A promise
without consideration is void, but there is no duty not to make it. The
making of such a promise has no effect whatever upon the action of
officers of the law. Certain contracts of wagering or in restraint of
trade have at times been unenforceable and void. Their making is
not a breach of jural duty, however, unless the law goes further and
declares that they will invalidate other agreements made in connection
with them or affixes some other penalty. If "nullity" is included among
jural sanctions, the fleld of right and duty would be greatly enlarged
without advantage.
The societal sanction or penalty need not consist of affirmative action
by "officers of the law"; and yet it must be such as to affect their action
somehow and disadvantageously to the wrongdoer. Otherwise, we
should have no distinction between legal rights and duties and moral
rights and duties. In a number of instances above, the sanction con-
sisted in a change in the jural relations of the wrongdoer: he became
"outlaw" or he lost his property rights or he became bound by a
contract. These changes in jural relations mean in every instance that
the action of "officers of the law" will not be what it otherwise would
have been. If their conduct will not be affected in any manner, we may
be talking morality but we are not talking law. A parent who loves to
lie about the accomplishments of his offspring may find that his
neighbors shun his presence; but the police will not arrest him, the
judge will not award damages, he has lost none of his jural rights as to
person or goods. It is true that in socially ostracising him his fellow
citizens are penalizing his conduct, often more severely than when the
penalty is applied by the judges and the police. In each case the penalty
is intended to discourage conduct regarded as undesirable socially. It
is usage alone that justifies us in restricting the field of the law and
' The act of suicide may itself be a crime and there may be various societal
penalties for attempting suicide or even for succeeding in the attempt. See
Mikell, Is Suicide Murder? (903) 3 CoL. L. REv. 379.
In like manner the "duty" to retreat when attacked appears not to be a duty.
Failure to retreat is not punished by any jural deprivation; but the person
attacked has the power by retreating of gaining the jural privilege of hitting back.
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jural rights and duties to the field of action of certain recognized
societal agents.30
Action by an irregular mob should never be regarded as action by
societal agents, in spite of the fact that in some instances their feelings
and actions will be approved by nearly the whole population. Such
action is so lacking in uniformity that in general it cannot be predicted,
it is confessedly contrary to the accepted rules, and it is generally
disapproved of by the majority of people within the legislative terri-
torial limits.
It is sometimes doubted whether international law is properly to be
regarded as law, and it is suggested that rights and duties recognized by
that system fall within the moral and not the jural field. This is because
of the lack of organization in international or world society and because
the sanctions of international law are perhaps less effective than are
those applied within the separate nations. -Organization, however, is not
lacking. The Foreign Offices operate with great regularity as societal
agents. Mixed Claims Commissions and other special international
courts act in the same capacity with frequency. We have the infant
League of Nations, The Hague Court, and the new World Court; and
in addition there have been international congresses from time almost
immemorial. There is no regularly *organized police force, but we
can point to examples of a posse comitatus. There exists a body of
rules, some of which are as nearly certain to be obeyed' as are the rules
of national law. It is not easy, even within the field of national law,
to draw the exact boundary line between morality and law, between
moral rights and duties and jural rights and duties. It may be that the
drawing of this line is more difficult in the international field; but
the same tests are to be applied, and it is believed that there are suf-
"It is possible for individuals to exclude action by "recognized societal
agents"--the judicial and executive or administrative officers-and thus prevent
the existence of jural rights and duties although expressly creating moral rights
and duties. In Rose & Frank Co. v. Crompton [1923, C. A.] 2 K. B. 261, the
parties drew up a writing involving large sales of goods between England and
America, covering a period of years. One paragraph was as follows: "This
arrangement is not entered into, nor is this memorandum written, as a formal
or legal agreement, and shall not be subject to legal jurisdiction in the Law
Courts either of the United States or England, but it is only a definite expres-
sion and record of the purpose and intention of the three parties concerned to
which they each honorably pledge themselves with the fullest confidence, based
on past business with each other, that it will be carried through by each of
the three parties with mutual loyalty and friendly co6peration." It was held
that action would not lie for a breach. Bankes, L. J., said (p. 283) that "the
document is only an honorable pledge, and that all legal consequences and
remedies are excluded from it." In Straus v. Cunningham (1913, ist Dept.)
159 App. Div. 718, i44 N. Y. Supp. 1014, a composition agreement was made
whereby the creditors released the debtor from "all legal obligation," but the
latter expressly reserved and continued "his moral obligation." See also Smith
v. Macdonald (1918) 37 Calif. App. 503, 174 Pac. 8o; Monroe v. Martin (1gI)
137 Ga. 262, 73 S. E. 341.
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ficient organization, sufficient sanction, and sufficient certainty in
prediction to justify existing usage of the term "international law."
BREACH OF DUTY CONSISTS OF CONDUCT, NOT OF ITS CONSEQUENCES
It is of importance to observe that the "command" of society is
always directed to the act of B and not to its consequences. B's breach
of duty occurs at the time of his act or forbearance to act, not after-
wards. There is no breach of duty ex post facto, depending upon the
consequences. To act or not to act, that is the question for B to
answer. The name that we apply to his act, the epithets that we hurl
at B, and the amount of the penalty to be enforced against him may all
depend upon the consequences of his act. But as already observed, a
change in the amount of a penalty does not change the duty, and the
existence of duty does not depend upon the size of the penalty.
Suppose that B shoots at A. This is called an "assault" at once;
it will be called "battery" when the bullet hits A, and "homicide" when
A dies a week later. The character of B's act, whether physical char-
acter or jural character, is the same whether A dies or not. B's act is
complete, finished. But the societal action to be caused thereby
depends, for various reasons, upon the subsequent event. The act of
B was either a breach of duty when he fired or it was not. The same
is true if we regard B's act from the standpoint of the law of torts
instead of the law of crimes. B's act is a tort, irrespective of the
amount of injury to A, if there is any injury at all. And yet the size
of the compensatory penalty or sanction depends upon the subsequent
suffering of A.
Duty to use care. It will be observed that in the foregoing case there
is both a criminal and a civil sanction, involving affirmative action by
officers of the law against B, from the moment of his action. A much
harder case for analysis can be found in the field of negligence. Is
there a legal duty on B to be careful? Is it B's duty to A not to be
negligent? Able thinkers have certainly answered these questions in
the negative. They say that B is legally privileged with respect to A
to be as negligent as possible, provided no harm comes to A, that B's
only duty to A is the duty not to cause him harm. It is difficult to
combat these views; and yet an effort will be made to do so.
We must first exclude the question of B's "duty to society"
(so called). Negligent conduct is sometimes made criminal irrespec-
tive of consequences, a sanction being provided that amply establishes
the legal duty not to be negligent in the forbidden way. A test case is one
where we can assume that B owes no duty whatever to society, but
where A can get damages if and only if he is hurt. Can B commit a
breach of duty to A by negligent conduct even though A is not hurt
at all?
Suppose that B shoots a gun where shooting is not forbidden by law.
A is in the vicinity, as B knows. B negligently shoots in such a direc-
tion that if A steps forward the bullet will hit him, and will not hit him
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if he does not step forward. Should we make B's duty not to aim in
that direction and pull the trigger dependent on the subsequent act of
A? B's act is identical, whether A steps forward or not. He was
equally negligent, whether A is hit or not. It was A's known position
that made B's act negligent, and not A's stepping forward after B
pulled the trigger. If A is hit, money damages show that B committed
a breach of duty to him when B acted. This was a duty not to pull the
trigger as and when he did. If A is not hit, there will be no money
damages. Can it be that neither B nor anyone else can determine
whether or not he is committing a breach of duty until the subsequent
fortuitous action of A?
Three solutions of the problem suggest themselves: (i) B's duty
not to pull the trigger is dependent on matter ex post facto. If A steps
forward B's act was wrongful; if A does not step forward B's act was
not wrongful. During the seconds of time after firing no one can
tell whether it was wrong or not. (2) B was under no duty not to fire
as he did; but after firing it was his duty to run with the bullet and
prevent it from hitting A. (3) B was under a duty to A not to fire
as and when he did, irrespective of whether A is hit or not.
Perhaps something can be said for each solution, and each has its
difficulties. The second seems absurd; and the third will be adopted
rather than the first for reasons following. The purpose of the societal
command is the practical one of influencing the condtict of B so as to
make the world a safer place for A. The command to B is to act with
proper care at the time when he has physical power to affect results.
There would indeed be cases where it would not be negligent to start
a body in motion, but where on learning of A's proximity it would be
negligent not to run after the moving body and stop it. There is no
negligence, however, in not running after a bullet. The forbidden
negligent act is the act that starts the bullet. The common form of
expression is that it was B's duty not to shoot, to act carefully and not
negligently, a duty that is breached when he acts. This is also the
prevailing judicial form of expression.8 ' B's duty can be determined
ab initio by comparing his proposed action with the standard of conduct
set by the law-that of the reasonably prudent man. The character
and the amount of the penalty may indeed be determined by matters
ex post facto; but the standard is determined, not by these ex post facto
consequences in the specific case, but by previous consequences in
similar cases.
Is there a penalty of any character or any amount if the bullet does
no harm to A? The definition of legal duty adopted herein requires
some societal penalty for breach. The third solution of our problem
cannot be accepted, therefore, unless we can find some sort of sanction
or penalty, even in the case where A is not it. In the case under dis-
'Thus, in rob Edwards v. Birmingham Canal Nav. (1923, C. A.) 40 T. L. R.
88, 92, Scrutton, L. J., said: "I appreciate that to get negligence you must have
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cussion, physical compulsion is quite possible, even before A is hit,
although money damages are not. The command to B is to forbear to
shoot, and it would be physically enforced if a policeman happened to be
near enough. A court of equity would grant an injunction if circum-
stances permitted.3 2 It is not feasible to send out a policeman with
every man carrying a gun in the woods or to get an injunction between
rifle shots; but in the fortunate cases where the sanction happens to be
a duty to be careful, but I think that a landowner has a duty to take reasonable
care not to allow his land to remain a receptacle for a thing which may cause
damage to his neighbors."
In Burke v. Cook (1923, Mass.) 141 N. E. 585, in defining "gross negligence"
the court says: "It amounts to indifference to present legal duty and to utter
forgetfulness of legal obligations so far as other persons may be affected. It is a
heedless and palpable violation of legal duty respecting the rights of others."
It should be observed that definition depends on usage. Where usage is
doubtful xr conflicting, it is desirable to mould usage. By adopting a particular
definition we are not attaining any "ultimate reality" or the "nature of things."
We are merely passing judgment upon what usage renders the best service.
In drawing the line, in the diminuendo of societal sanctions, and restricting
jural rights and duties to cases on one side of the line, it is not to be supposed
that it is a necessary line or an inevitable classification. It is believed, how-
ever, that it is useful to draw the line and to adopt definitions so as to justify
the greatest possible amount of judicial and popular usage, while at the same
time avoiding vague or conflicting usage.
2 So far as the writer knows, this has not been established by decisions. The
general principle is well established, however, that threatened irreparable injury
will be prevented by injunction. "It is not necessary, before a writ to prevent
a wrong can issue, that the wrong should actually have been committed." Pop-
penhusen v. N. Y. Comb Co. (1858, C. C. S. I1. N. Y.) 4 Blatchf. 184, i87, Fed.
Cas. No. II, 281. See also Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg (igol)
185 U. S. 65, 22 Sup. Ct. 585. In Earl Ripon v. Hobart (1834, Ch.) 3 Mylne &
K. 169, 176, Lord Brougham said: "Proceeding upon practical views of human
affairs, the law will guard against risks which are so imminent that rio prudent
person would incur them, although they do not amount to absolute certainty of
damage. Nay, it will go further, and according to the same practical and
rational view, and, balancing the magnitude of the evil against the chances of
its occurrence, it will even provide against a somewhat less imminent probability
in cases where the mischief, should it be done, would be vast and overwhelming."
The storage of gunpowder or other dangerous substance where negligent acts
or natural processes are likely to cause irreparable injury will be prevented by
injunction. See Crowder v. Tinkler (1816, Ch.) 19 Ves. 617; Hepburn v. Lordan
(I865, Ch.) 2 Hem. & M. 345; Fletcher v. Bealey (1884) L. R. 28 Ch. Div. 688.
In Cowper Essex v. Local Board (1889, H. L.) 14 A. C. 153, I6o, Lord Halsbury
said: "It is doubtless attributed to Lord Hardwicke that he once said 'the fears
of mankind, though they may be reasonable ones, will not create a nuisance.'
But if Lord Hardwicke ever really did say so it is quite clear that it is not now
the law, if the fears are assumed to be reasonable. The existence of a large
collection of explosive matter in the vicinity of a town has been held to be a
nuisance. The good sense of mankind recognizes the fact that occasional negli-
gence is one of the ordinary incidents of human life .... I do not think it
is any answer to tell people who complain of the establishment of sewage works
in their neighborhood that if and when the sewage works become a nuisance ....
such works can be restrained by injunction."
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practicable, it is also available for A's benefit. Neither the police nor
the Chancellor is required to permit B's act and to await results before
acting against B. Even in cases where no policeman is at hand and a
bill in equity is impracticable, there is one sort of societal penalty that
infallibly exists from the time of B's negligent act and before A is
hurt. B becomes at once an insurer of A against loss; he is under a
conditional duty to pay loss if it occurs. As already seen, the sanction
of a legal duty may consist of some detrimental change in jural rela-
tions. The position of an insurer is detrimental in fact and in law. A
promise to be an insurer, creating a conditional duty to pay money, is a
sufficient "consideration" in the law of contracts, even though the event
constituting the condition may never occur and the money never have
to be paid. It involves what we call "risk." That it is detrimental to
carry such a risk everyone knows. It causes the bearer of the risk to
set aside a reserve fund, to re-insure at considerable cost, to alter his
investments. The instant that B negligently shoots he becomes the
bearer of this risk, this conditional duty, as a penalty for his rash act.
That it is a real penalty, his own conduct often at once attests. He
stands aghast at the chance of harm and the chance that he will be
reduced to beggary by a heavy judgment. He runs away, even before
he knows the result of his act. He knows that he has done wrong.
The duty of B to forbear from negligent acts is not a conditional
duty; it is instant and unconditional. The time has come for instant
action, without waiting for a single new operative fact. It is the par-
ticular penalty called compensation to A that is conditional on a future
uncertain event. This uncertainty weakens the sanction, but it does
not wholly eliminate it. B's secondary and remedial duty to pay dam-
ages to A is indeed subject to a condition precedent-A must be
harmed; but B's primary duty to forbear from negligent shooting is
subject to no condition precedent, nor will it be discharged by any
condition subsequent.
The reasoning in the foregoing problem suggests an answer for
another question in the law of negligence. Suppose that B negligently
fired and that A negligently stepped forward into the bullet. Does B
have the legal privilege of harming A in those cases where A is guilty
of contributory negligence? The answer to this is no. Here again
the command of society is directed to B and his acts, not to conse-
quences. The particular penalty called compensation to A may be con-
ditional not only on harm to A but on the absence of contributory
negligence. No doubt society will forcibly prevent B's act when prac-
ticable, without regard to A's contributory ngeligence; and again B will
occupy the position of an insurer from the instant he negligently shoots,
his duty to pay damages being conditional on A's not negligently
contributing (within the doctrine of "the last clear chance").
